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After several decades of “state-capitalism” characterized by import substitution policies, 
Bolivia implemented in 1985 a New Economic Policy (NEP) following neo-liberal ideas of 
free trade, privatization, and liberalization of capital flows. It was hoped that the opening up 
of the economy would attract foreign direct investment (FDI) which in turn would help 
modernize Bolivian industry, improve productivity, increase exports, stimulate growth, and 
reduce poverty. This paper investigates to what extent this actually happened.  
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I   Introduction 
 
After several decades of “state-capitalism” characterized by import substitution policies, 
Bolivia implemented in 1985 a New Economic Policy (NEP) following neo-liberal ideas of 
free trade, privatization, and liberalization of capital flows. The NEP started with a very 
effective stabilization package that stopped record level hyperinflation (almost 25,000% per 
year), liberalized prices, exchange rates and interest rates, abolished export and import 
controls, and reduced the public sector deficit
1. The NEP was later complemented by 
structural reforms, consisting of privatization, pension reform, decentralization, and 
education reform
2.   
 
It was hoped that the opening up of the economy would attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) which in turn would help modernize Bolivian industry, improve productivity, increase 
exports, stimulate growth, and reduce poverty. In this chapter we will investigate to what 
extent this actually happened. The chapter is organized as follows: Section II describes trade 
policy and the evolution of trade in Bolivia before and after the introduction of the NEP. 
Section III discusses the privatization and capitalization processes that led to rapidly 
increasing FDI flows into Bolivia. Section IV describes the evolution of per capita growth, 
poverty and other welfare indicators, and Section V analyzes how trade and FDI have 
affected growth, inequality and poverty in the Bolivian case. Section VI concludes. 
 
II   Trade 
 
The NEP quickly simplified the previously very complex tariff regime introducing a single 
import tariff of 20% for all goods. By 1990 this tariff was further reduced to 10%, and later 
the tariff on capital goods was reduced to 5%. Simultaneously, there were various efforts to 
promote and diversify exports. In 1987, the National Institute for Exports was created, 




In order to improve access to export markets, Bolivia signed several regional trade 
agreements and improved on already existing agreements. During the 1990s, Bolivia signed 
several partial integration agreements through the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA): Peru (1992), Chile (1993) and MERCOSUR (1997), and a free trade agreement with 
Mexico (1995). Moreover, Bolivia is a beneficiary country of the Andean Trade Preference 
Act (1991) from the United States and the Andean Generalized System of Preferences (1990) 
from the European Union. Both agreements granted preferential tariffs as support for the 
Andean Community’s war on drugs, under the principle of shared responsibility. Recently, 
Bolivia signed a partial integration agreement with Cuba (2000) and is a beneficiary country 
of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication (ATPDEA). 
 
Although Bolivia was hailed as an early and profound reformer
4, the shift to a more open 
economy actually had little effect on trade. If anything, it appears that exports as a percentage 
of GDP fell after the implementation of trade liberalization policies (see Chart 1). 
 
                                                 
1 For a complete description of the stabilization package, see Morales & Sachs (1990). 
2 For a thorough review of structural reforms in Bolivia, see Antelo & Jemio (2000). 
3 Antelo & Jemio (2000, p. 42). 
4 E.g. Lora (2001).   3
The disappointing export 
performance since 1985 could 
potentially be due to falling 
export prices, so it is 
important to have a look at the 
evolution of prices for our 
main export goods. Between 
1980 and 2002, our main 
export good has been natural 
gas with a contribution of US$ 
4.8 billion. Natural gas does 
not have a world market price, 
but is determined by long term 
contracts in bilateral 
negotiations between the 
seller and a very limited 
number of buyers.  
 
Chart 2 shows the evolution of the price that Bolivia has been able to charge for its natural 
gas from its two international buyers, Argentina and Brazil. During the last 30 years, that 
price has varied by more than a factor 17, from a low of US$ 0.28 per thousand cubic feet in 
1972 to a high of US$ 4.81 in 1983 and 1984. Before the first oil crisis, the price was even 
lower. Between 1962 and 1967, the price was fixed at just US$ 0.08 per thousand cubic feet. 
 
The price has dropped 
dramatically since 1985, clearly 
contributing to a worsening in 
the terms of trade. However, the 
current price levels do not 
appear low, neither in a long run 
perspective nor in comparison 
to alternative energy sources. It 
is not clear, either, that high 
prices would be beneficial for 
Bolivia. The high prices during 
the early eighties coincide with 
the worst recession in recent 
history, and the relatively 
favourable prices by the 
beginning of the present century 
also coincide with a recession 
period (see Chart 6 further below). 
 
Bolivia’s main export metals are tin, zinc, gold, and silver with exports of US$ 3.0 billion, 
2.4 billion, 1.2 billion and 1.2 billion, respectively between 1980 and 2002. Chart 3 shows 
price indices for these 4 commodities, with 1985 US$ current prices set to 100. The prices of 
tin and silver have been relatively low since 1985, which helps explain part of the poor export 
performance. On the other hand, the prices of zinc and gold have been relatively high. There 
was also a period between 1979 and 1984 where all prices were highly favourable, but 
























































































Import substitution Neo-liberal policies
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank.








































































































Source: YPFB.  4
exports nevertheless not 
particularly high, and the whole 
economy in deep recession with 
per capita GDP growth between 
–2% and –6% (see Chart 6 
below).  
 
The last very important export 
product, soya, with accumulated 
exports of US$ 2.3 billion just 
between 1990 and 2002, has 
experienced relatively stable 
prices, with the high prices in 
1998 being only 30% higher 
than the low prices in 2001. 
  
The poor export performance since 1985 can only partly be attributed to unfavourable export 
prices, and the prices only appear low in comparison to the unusually high prices experienced 
in the early 1980s. In 2003, export prices were considered quite favourable, but exports were 
still insufficient for creating economic growth
5. 
 
It would seem, at a first glance, that the basic premises of the NEP have failed. Privatization 
and trade liberalization did not stimulate more exports, and exports could thus not help 
generate faster growth and more rapid poverty reduction. However, this is too superficial a 
conclusion, because much more important than the total volume of exports is the composition 
and quality of exports, and this has changed substantially since the period of import 
substitution. 
 
Chart 4 shows that in 1980, mining products (mainly tin and silver) comprised almost two 
thirds of the total value of exports, and hydrocarbons contributed almost one quarter. These 
two groups together are called traditional export goods in Bolivia, because they historically 
have accounted for almost all of the country’s exports. In 1980, only 14% of exports were 
non-traditional, including mainly sugar, coffee, and some wood products.  
 
By 2002, the picture had changed substantially. Mining only accounted for around one 
quarter of exports, while non-traditional exports have become almost as important as 
traditional exports. Soya and soya derivatives accounted for half of all non-traditional 







                                                 
5 See for example Fundación Milenio (2004). 





















































































































The change in the composition of exports may not have much effect on the overall GDP 
growth rate, but it could still have substantial impacts on the distribution of income, and thus 
on poverty, since the persons involved in the production of non-traditional export products 
are completely different from the ones working in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors. 
 
In this paper, rather than investigating the impact of trade on growth, and growth on poverty, 
at the aggregate levels, we will instead explore the impacts of changes in the composition of 
exports on changes in the distribution of income and thus on changes in poverty. We will also 
explore to what extent FDI has been a determinant of the observed change in the composition 
of exports.  
 
 
III  Privatization and FDI in Bolivia  
 
For most of the 1990s, the Bolivian economy experienced sharp increases in the levels of 
FDI. Although the stock of FDI is one of the smallest in Latin America, it represented the 
largest average annual ratio of FDI to GDP (see Table 1). During the period 1990-2000, most 
FDI into Bolivia came from the US (39%), Europe (28%) and South America (27%). FDI 
from the neighbouring countries Argentina (11%), Brazil (7%) and Chile (5%) is also 
important. Over the same period, the hydrocarbons sector attracted around 40% of total FDI 
inflows, while the services sectors attracted 26% (mostly finance, constructions and 
transport), utilities and telecommunication 17%, manufacturing 9%, and mining 7%.  
 



















Source: National Statistical Institute.   6
 
Chart 5 shows that the interest of foreign investors in Bolivia accelerated in the second half of 
the 1990s, when the Second-
Generation Structural Reforms 
(SGSR) improved the economic 
policy framework. The new set of 
reforms constituted a deepening 
of the original First Generation 
Structural Reforms (FGSR), 
launched at the same time as the 
stabilisation programme in 1985. 
The reforms established a 
favourable regulatory framework 
for FDI by relaxing rules 
regarding market entry and 
foreign ownership and improving 
the treatment accorded to foreign 
firms and the functioning of 
markets. 
 
An inappropriate policy framework can in part explain the slow growth of FDI in the early 
1990s. The FGSR, which included goods markets deregulation, and fiscal, trade and financial 
reforms, appear not to have been focused on the locational decisions of foreign investors. 
Moreover, political instability and the uncertainty regarding the success of the stabilisation 
programme constrained both foreign and domestic investment. Although clear rules for 
foreign investment were set out already in the early 1990s, mainly through the Investment 
Law (1990) and the Privatisation Law (1992), foreign investors did not really become 
interested until strategic state monopolies were opened up to private investors.    
 
The Capitalisation Law (CL) was launched in 1994 and is considered the centrepiece of the 
SGSR. It established the economic and legal conditions for capitalising (Bolivian term for 
privatising) large state-owned companies and promoting foreign capital inflows. Under the 
capitalisation process, the six principal state-owned enterprises, YPFB (oil and gas), ENDE 
(electricity), ENFE (railways), ENTEL (telecommunications), LAB (aviation) and EMV 
Table 1 
Net Inflows of FDI, 1990-2000 
 
Accumulated Flows  Annual Average  
Region or Country 
(US$ m.)  Share (%)  (US$ m.)  (% of GDP) 
Latin American & Caribbean   453558 100.0 41233 -
South America  328012 72.3 29819 -
Argentina 79795 17.6 7254 2.7
Bolivia 4730 1.0 430 5.6
Brazil 137494 30.3 12499 1.9
Chile 36308 8.0 3301 5.2
Colombia 20406 4.5 1855 2.2
Ecuador 5264 1.2 479 2.9
Paraguay 1491 0.3 136 1.7
Peru 16016 3.5 1456 2.8
Uruguay 1374 0.3 125 0.6
Venezuela 25134 5.5 2285 2.7
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
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Source: Central Bank and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment of Bolivia.  7
(mining and smelting), were put up for sale by international tender and the winning bidders 
gained management control and a 50% stake in the enterprise, while the government retained 
the remaining 50% share. In addition, unlike traditional privatisation schemes where funds 
are transferred to the government, capitalisation required the successful bidder to invest the 
money in the company itself over a stated period, effectively securing fixed capital 
investment.  
 
The process has had a considerable impact on FDI because it has promoted the creation of 
firms backed by foreign capital or capitalised enterprises (CEs) and produced investment 
commitments worth around US$ 1.7 billion in the period since 1995. In addition, the policy 
framework has given enterprises the opportunity to access abundant natural resources, such 
as hydrocarbons and water, and control of companies with monopoly power, such as 
electricity and telecommunications.  
 
Capitalised enterprises were responsible for almost 40% of all inflows to Bolivia in the period 
1995-2001. While the investment boom in the CEs is now coming to an end, FDI in other 
sectors shows a continued upward trend, partly encouraged by the liberal investment climate 
demonstrated by the capitalisation process. However, the end of the wave of capitalisations 
coincided with a worldwide economic crisis as well as increased political and economic 
instability in Bolivia, all of which deterred FDI inflows.  
 
 
IV  Growth, Poverty and Inequality in Bolivia  
 
Economic growth in Bolivia has been very erratic and entirely insufficient for the purpose of 
reducing the very high poverty rates observed, especially in rural areas. 
 
Chart 6 shows annual per capita GDP growth rates between 1966 and 2002. The average 
growth rate is zero, implying that the level of productivity in Bolivia is now precisely the 
same as it was in the mid 1960s. It does appear, however, that the volatility of growth has 
fallen after the introduction of the NEP in 1985, and average per capita GDP growth has also 
been positive since 1985 (averaging 0.7% per year between 1986 and 2002). 
 
Despite the lack of productivity 
growth, there has been some 
progress in poverty reduction. 
Especially non-monetary indi-
cators of well-being show sig-
nificant improvements between 
the 1976 and 2001. According 
to the census of 1976, 85.5% of 
the population were suffering 
from Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
(UBN). By 2001, this share had 
fallen to 58.6%, reflecting 
massive public investment in 
basic services, such as water, 
sanitation, and education (see 
Table 2). 
 



































































































Source: World Develoment Indicators, The World Bank.  8
The share of people who do not have even their basic needs satisfied is still much too high, 
however, and the regional disparities are getting more and more pronounced. Table 2 shows 
that the regions that were initially less poor have shown sharper reductions in poverty than 
the initially poorest regions, implying that regional inequality is widening. Potosí continues to 
be the poorest department in the country, with 79.7% of its population with unsatisfied basic 
needs, showing hardly any progress since 1992 (80,5%). Santa Cruz, on the other hand, had 
the lowest level of unsatisfied basic needs in 1976 and showed the biggest reduction in 
poverty between 1976 and 2001 (41,2 percentage points). 
 
Table 2: Population with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN), 1976 - 2001 
Census Average  annual  change 
Region  1976 1992 2001  1976-2001  1992-2001 
Chuquisaca  90,5 79,8 70,1  -0,82  -1,05 
La  Paz  83,2 71,1 66,2  -0,68  -0,53 
Cochabamba  85,1 71,1 55,0  -1,21  -1,74 
Oruro  84,5 70,2 67,8  -0,67  -0,26 
Potosí  92,8 80,5 79,7  -0,53  -0,09 
Tarija  87,0 69,2 50,8  -1,45  -1,99 
Santa  Cruz  79,2 60,5 38,0  -1,65  -2,43 
Beni  91,4 81,0 76,0  -0,62  -0,54 
Pando  96,4 83,8 72,4  -0,96  -1,23 
Bolivia  85,5 70,9 58,6  -1,08  -1,33 
     Source: INE-UDAPE (2002). 
 
Much of the improvement in non-monetary poverty indicators has been possible due to 
generous foreign aid (averaging 10% of GDP since 1985). But although people have been 
provided with education, water, sanitation and health services, their income earning capacity 
has barely increased, and monetary poverty has thus remained stubbornly high, despite 
reforms, foreign aid, and FDI. 
 
The data on income poverty is very limited, due to a lack of national household surveys 
before 1997. However Klasen & Thiele (2004) has recently made a fair attempt at estimating 
national poverty rates back to 1989 using a new methodology combining urban income 
surveys with national health surveys. Although the estimations are still preliminary, the basic 
trends are likely to be correct. 
 
Their results show substantial reductions in income poverty in urban areas during the 1990s, 
but there appears to be a partial reversal during 2000-2002. In rural areas there was a 
moderate reduction in poverty during the second half of the 1990s, but an almost complete 
reversal during the first years of this decade (see Chart 7). Thus, these 13 years of structural 
and social reforms supported by a massive influx of foreign aid and foreign direct investment, 
have barely bade a dent in rural poverty. It appears that the rural part of the country is 
insulated from the rest of the Bolivian economy, unable to benefit from any trickle-down 
effects there might be from reform-induced growth.   9
 
It is interesting to notice that the 
relatively good year in terms of 
poverty (1999) coincides with a 
record  low level of exports 
(17% of GDP, see Chart 1), 
whereas the relatively bad years 
(1989 and 2002) coincide with 
relatively high levels of exports, 
at least by after-1985 standards 
(22% of GDP). These casual 
observations make it unlikely 
that even a thorough empirical 
analysis could demonstrate that 
overall exports would have a 
significant beneficial impact on 
poverty in Bolivia.  
 
Klasen & Thiele (2004) also provide estimates of the evolution of inequality between 1989 
and 2002 using the same methodology of combining national health surveys with urban 
income sur-veys. The results indicate that overall inequality is approxi-mately the same in 
2002 as it was in 1989 (Gini coefficient around 55) but with a dip in 1999 corresponding to 
the lower poverty that year, and with substantial differences between rural and urban areas 
(see Chart 8). Whereas inequality 
in the capital cities seems to have 
increased dramatically between 
1994 and 2002, rural and 
provincial poverty seem to have 
fallen. It thus appears that the fate 
of the urban population, including 
the urban poor, has been closely 
linked to macro developments and 
has recently led to a significant 
deterioration in poverty and 
inequality. In contrast, the much 
poorer rural population have been 
more detached from 
improvements and deteriorations 
in the overall economic 
environment and their poverty 




V  Impact of Trade and FDI Policies on the Economy 
 
FDI and growth  
 
FDI is generally believed to promote economic growth in the recipient country by increasing 
total investment and improving efficiency through the introduction of new technology and 

































Capital Cities Towns Rural Total
Source: Klasen & Thiele (2004). Note: 1989 and 1994 poverty are estimated 
using National Health Surveys in addition to urban household surveys.
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Source: Klasen & Thiele (2004). Note: 1989 and 1994 numbers are estimated 
using National Health Surveys in addition to urban income surveys.  10
better management practices. Nevertheless, the realisation of these benefits depends crucially 
on the existence of certain channels through which technological and management spillovers 
can be effected, such as through demonstration-imitation, backward-forward linkages, 
competition or education and training. 
 
In the case of developing countries, the empirical evidence shows a positive relationship 
between FDI and growth, but there is no agreement on whether FDI leads to growth or vice 
versa. Cross-section evidence supports the hypothesis that FDI requires preconditions to 
promote growth. For example, Borensztein et al. (1998) point out that FDI has a positive 
effect on growth when the country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital; and 
Alfaro et al. (2002) find that FDI promotes growth in economies with sufficiently developed 
financial markets. 
 
Although the international evidence for these complementary effects is relatively strong, it is 
difficult to find such effects for a time-series analysis in the case of Bolivia. Table 3 shows 
that neither education nor financial market development interact significantly with FDI in 
their effect on growth. Trade, on the other hand, does seem to have a complementary effect 
on FDI. Only when the ratio of trade to GDP is more than 52%, will FDI raise growth. This 
suggests that policies that promote exports (e.g. reducing the fixed costs of exporting by 
supporting transport infrastructure and distribution networks) would improve the impact of 
FDI. When interactions are omitted, FDI is not significantly correlated with growth. 
 
The lack of complementary effects between FDI and education and FDI and financial market 
development indicates that the contribution of FDI to economic growth may have been 
limited by local conditions. A low level of human capital limits the capacity to absorb new 
technology and apply modern management techniques, while underdeveloped financial 
markets limit the economy's ability to exploit potential FDI spillovers, because, in order to 
take full advantage of new knowledge, firms will generally have to do some restructuring, 
which will require financing (Alfaro et al., 2002). The commercial banking system in Bolivia 
is characterised by very high real interest rates, short-run loans, and requires a 200% real 
estate collateral.   
   11
 
 
The economy's ability to exploit potential FDI spillovers may also depend on its sectoral 
distribution. Table 4 shows that the most important destination of FDI has been capital-
intensive and skill-intensive sectors, like hydrocarbons, telecommunications, and electricity. 
While the hydrocarbons sector did experience the introduction of new processes, advanced 
technologies, managerial skills, employee training, international production networks, and 
access to markets, it created relatively few linkages with the local economy and thus fewer 
possibilities for significant spillovers. Similarly, FDI has contributed to the modernisation of 
telecommunications and electricity services, but the linkages with local suppliers are weak. 
As more than half of all FDI over the period 1996-2001 was directed into sectors with 
relatively few linkages, there may be fewer benefits of FDI to Bolivia than was expected by 
looking at the experiences of FDI in many East Asian countries where spillovers and linkage 
creation often related to manufacturing sectors such as electronics, automobile and garments 
and textiles. In Bolivia, only 8% of FDI went into manufacturing during 1996-2001, thus 
limiting the possibilities for reaping the advantages of potential spillovers.  
 
Table 3 
The effect of FDI on per capita GDP growth: Bolivia 
(1970-2000) 
 
Independent  Variable  (1)  (2) 






















c  0.12 
(0.17)   
Private Sector Credit/GDP 
   -0.01 
(0.05)   
Trade/GDP










FDI /GDP (lag 1)*Education  -1.99 
(1.40)   
FDI /GDP (lag 1)*Private Sector Credit/GDP  0.06 
(1.34)   




2 0.78  0.77 
R
2- Adjusted  0.71  0.72 
Durbin Watson  2.24  2.09 
Number of Observations  30  30 
Note: All the variables were found to be nonstationary, I(1), and the residuals from the 
regressions turned out to be I(0). The standard error is given in parentheses and the 




a State of Freedom by Freedom House: Those with ratings averaging 1-2.5 are generally 
considered "Free," 3-5.5 "Partly Free," and 5.5-7 "Not Free." 
b Structural Policy Efficiency Index (SPEI) (Lora, 2001): where 0 corresponds to the 
worst reading for any year and 1 to the best.  
c Secondary Gross Enrollment 
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On the basis of the results of a survey conducted with executives of foreign companies in 
Bolivia, Nina and Rojas (2001) find that access to natural resources and regional markets was 
amongst the main motivations for FDI. Recently, FDI in natural gas has helped gas to 
become the main export, accounting for 20% of total exports in 2002. However, Andersen 
and Faris (2002) argue that the effects of a substantial increase in natural gas exports due to 
capitalisation may lead to a temporary (but not permanent) increase in GDP growth during 
the few years of rapidly expanding export volumes. 
 
Since FDI does not automatically lead to growth, public policies may be required to attract 
FDI and create an enabling environment to benefit from it. Vidaurre (2002) points out that the 
government needs to pay attention to additional factors that influence investors’ locational 
decisions. He suggests a range of business facilitation measures that seek to reduce costs 
through a combination of improvements in communications infrastructure and the creation of 
larger markets. He also mentions that the manufacturing sector would benefit from a clear 
investment policy, since technology diffusion is not an automatic consequence of the 
presence of some knowledge stock. 
 
One of the channels through which FDI can enhance economic growth in host countries is by 
increasing total investment. FDI can crowd in or crowd out domestic investment. However, 
on average, Bosworth and Collins (1999) find that an increase of a dollar in FDI is associated 
with an increase in total domestic investment by an average of 80 cents in developing 
countries. In Bolivia, data analysis suggests that only half of FDI translates into an increase in 
total domestic investment (see Chart 9), although this increases to a one-for-one increase in 
total domestic FDI investment through the capitalisation process. In the remaining sectors, 
the impact of FDI on total domestic investment has been very low, and it has encouraged 
little if any complementary local investment.  
Table 4 
FDI and export compositions by sector (%) 
(Accumulated Stock: 1996 – 2001) 
 
Sector  FDI Share  Export Share 
Primary 35.5  42.6 
Hydrocarbons 34.1  11.6 
Mining 1.3  20.3 
Agriculture 0.1  10.7 
Manufacturing 8.0  57.4 
Food products and beverages  3.3  22.8 
Refined petroleum products  2.1  0.9 
Non-metallic mineral products  0.8  0.2 
Furniture and jewelry  0.7  6.4 
Basic metals  0.3  15.7 
Chemicals and chemical products  0.3  0.7 
Paper and paper products  0.2  0.2 
Other manufacturing  0.2  10.4 
Service 56.1  0.0 
Telecommunications 14.1   
Construction 10.2   
Electricity 7.3   
Transport via pipeline (natural gas)  5.3   
Financial intermediation  4.7   
Transport 3.3   
Other services  11.3   
Total   (US$ m.)  4,965 7,090 
Source: National Institute of Statistics of Bolivia   13
  
 
FDI through capitalisation may also have reduced the need for local public investment and 
this may have enabled a reallocation of public investment from the productive to the social 
sector. This reallocation can partly compensate for the lack of spillovers, as it allows the 
government to invest directly in people, including those outside the foreign companies. 
However, the role of government should extend beyond reallocating public funds. For 
instance, privatised natural monopolies, such as water and electricity, require strict regulation 
to protect consumers. 
 
FDI, Inequality and Poverty  
 
The effects of FDI on income inequality can be analysed through the effects on wage 
inequality and non-wage inequality. According to Te Velde (2002), the effects of FDI on 
wage inequality can be analysed by looking at (i) composition effects (foreign firms may 
have different skill intensities from domestic firms), (ii) skill-specific technological change 
(FDI could induce faster productivity growth of labour in both foreign and domestic firms), 
(iii) skill-specific wage bargaining (skilled workers are usually in a stronger bargaining 
position than less skilled workers), and (iv) training and education (foreign firms generally 
undertake more training than local counterparts). The effects on non-wage income could be 
indirect, for instance through public policies or partnerships between foreign firms, 
governments, and local communities. 
 
The empirical evidence shows that some Latin American countries have experienced an 
increase in wage inequality as a result of FDI. In the case of Bolivia, Te Velde (2002) finds 
that FDI may have accounted for a significant part of the observed increase in urban wage 
inequality during the period 1987-97, with FDI correlated with lower real wages for skilled 
and unskilled workers. Recently, Vedia (2002) found that the capital-intensive sectors have 
significant positive correlations with the fifth quintile of urban income distribution. 
Furthermore, as Table 5 shows, the real wages of workers in the capital-intensive sectors 
have experienced a revival since 1996. Workers in these sectors tend to be the more educated 





















        Sources: Developing Countries: Bosworth and Collins (1999) – Period 1979 - 1995. 
               Bolivia: Own estimations – Period 1976 - 2000. 
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The results can in part be explained by the fact that FDI has gone into the skill-intensive 
sectors, thus creating a relative shortage of skilled labour. The TNCs have had to train their 
workers intensively, and subsequently pay them higher salaries to prevent them depart in with 
that newly acquired knowledge. These findings are supported by Andersen and Faris (2002), 
who find that the expansion of the hydrocarbons sector mainly benefits the groups that 
initially earned the highest incomes, i.e. skilled workers. Similarly, Jemio and Wiebelt (2002) 
find that FDI worsens income distribution slightly.    
 
There are valid reasons for concern about the deterioration in income distribution caused by 
FDI, particularly as there is no evidence of significant poverty reduction. The majority of 
poor people are working in agriculture, manufacturing and other services, three sectors which 
have seen deteriorating or stagnant real wages. The dramatic fall in agricultural incomes 
during the period of the FDI boom is particularly worrying, as it inevitably contributes to a 
deepening of poverty and likely pushes many people into extreme poverty. 
 
There are various public policies available that can help to improve the distributional effect of 
FDI. One is to use fiscal revenues for social investment (e.g. education) in the long-run 
development of the poorer segments of the economy. However, there are also private sector 
policies that can help to improve the developmental impact of FDI. In Bolivia there are 
examples of mining companies complementing their time limited exploitation activities with 
socially responsible and sustainable activities in order to smoothe boom-bust cycles in 
affected communities.  
 
 
Trade, inequality and poverty  
 
While there appears to be little effect of overall trade on growth in Bolivia (see Table 3), 
trade is obviously necessary for a highly indebted poor country which needs foreign 
exchange to service its debt and foreign exchange to buy essential investment goods that are 
not locally produced. It may also be the case that even though there is no relationship 
between aggregate trade, growth and poverty in Bolivia, people working in specific export 
sectors do benefit from such exports in terms of higher salaries and less poverty. In order to 
Table 5 













Employment Real Wage  
Agriculture 38.9  1.0  160  -2.0  -11.9 
Hydrocarbons and mining  1.4  19.9  2494  -4.7  28.3 
Manufacturing 10.1  10.5  612  -1.4  -2.8 
Electricity, water and gas  0.5  24.5  1759  7.6  9.9 
Construction 6.6  7.7  907  9.2  4.3 
Transport and communications  4.3  19.3  1160  1.5  -0.5 
Financial intermediation   0.5  77.3  2517  2.2  6.8 
Other services  37.6  27.8  754  2.9  0.0 
Total ( Persons)  3637048 509187          
Source: National Institute of Statistics  
Note: 
a Workers with more that 13 years of education. 
b June 1996 = 100   15
test this hypothesis, we have identified the principal sector of work (down to four ISIC
6 
digits) for each salaried person in the 2001 MECOVI household survey, and matched it with 
the value of exports in each of these sectors. 
 
The Bolivian working population is distributed among more than 200 different sectors, but 
only a few of these are important in terms of export. Table 6 shows seven of the most 
important export sectors, accounting for close to 80% of all exports in 2001, together with the 
number of people employed in each sector and the average monthly income gained by those 
who work in the sector
7. It is clear that the two main export sectors, soya and natural gas, are 
also the sectors that pay by far the highest salaries. The problem is that it is relatively few 
people who benefit from these high salaries, and the ones who do tend to be highly educated 
(in the case of the natural gas sector) or large land owners (in the case of soya production), so 
this kind of export would tend to worsen the income distribution. 
 
The remaining export sectors pay closer to the national average for salaried workers 
($135/month), with workers manufacturing jewellery doing slightly better ($146/month) than 
average, and workers making clothes doing somewhat worse ($95/month). Notice that the 
moderate poverty line is only about $40/month, so the people working in these export sectors 
are in general well above the poverty line, and changes in their salaries would thus not 
directly affect the poverty head count. 
 
Table 6:  Main Bolivian export sectors, employment and exports in 2001 
ISIC Sector  Employment
(1000 persons)




1514 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fat (soya)  3.7  510  317 
1110 Extraction of crude oil and natural gas  6.0  495  285 
1320 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores  35.0  137  185 
2720 Manufacture of basic and non-ferrous metals  n.d.  n.d.  146 
3691 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles  8.0  146  101 
2010 Sawmilling and planing of wood  4.5  139  25 
3610 Manufacture of furniture  40.8  131  23 
1810 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur  54.5  95  15 
Source: MECOVI 2001 and UN COMTRADE. Note: Employment numbers are estimated based on the MECOVI survey, which is not 
designed to be representative at the sectoral level. The numbers are therefore only rough approximations. In addition, the numbers only 
include persons who earn a positive income from the activity. Helping spouses and children who are not paid, are not included. 
 
In order to test whether trade has a positive impact on salaries at the individual level, we run 
a regression with the logarithm of the monthly salary as the dependent variable and the log of 
sectoral exports and imports as explanatory variables. A number of control variables, such as 
education, age, gender, ethnicity, work sector, and location, are also included. The regression 
results are shown in Table 7 below. 
 
The results show that the value of exports is indeed a positive and significant determinant of 
wages in the exporting sector. Holding everything else constant, persons working in sectors 
that export more would tend to earn higher monthly wages than persons working in tradeable 
sectors with less export. However, the estimated elasticity of wages with respect to exports is 
quite low. If one sector has twice as high exports as another, the level of salaries would only 
be 3% higher. Assuming that this estimated difference in salaries is indeed due to exports 
(and not to some unobserved variable such as capital intensity) we can also conclude that, if, 
                                                 
6 The International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) used by the United Nations. 
7 Only people earning positive income are counted. Helping spouses and children who do not receive any salary 
are thus ignored.   16
for example, exports of soya were to double, it would imply an increase in salaries of about 
3% for the people who work in the soya sector. 
 
Table 7 
The effect of sectoral imports and exports on  salaries (2001) 
Independent variable: Log (income)  Coefficient  t-value 
Constant   3.6551  20.78 
Years of education
  0.0566 19.27 
Age
  1.4326 14.55 
Age squared
  -0.1755 -11.82 
Dummy for woman 
   -0.3967 -14.18 
Dummy for indigenous
  -0.1546 -6.48 
Dummy for blue collar worker
  -0.3713 -5.03 
Dummy for white collar worker
  -0.3522 -4.74 
Dummy for self-employed  -0.8746  -12.01 
Dummy for cooperative worker  -0.7255  -5.91 
Dummy for work in family business  -0.6108  -6.48 
Dummy for public sector
  0.6557 6.20 
Dummy for traditional agriculture
  -0.3015 -5.51 
Dummy for electricity sector
  0.4263 3.69 
Dummy for construction sector
  0.4045 7.80 
Dummy for commerce sector
  0.4687 8.48 
Dummy for hotel and rest. sector
  0.6709 8.72 
Dummy for transportation sector
  0.5254 9.02 
Dummy for banking sector
  1.0945 5.79 
Dummy for highland residence  -0.3040  -10.46 
Dummy for lowland residence  0.1545  5.49 
Log (sectoral exports)  0.0301  4.09 
Log (sectoral imports)  -0.0187  -2.51 
R
2 0.3513   
Number of Observations  8014   
  Source: Author’s estimation based on MECOVI 2001 and trade data from UN COMTRADE.  
Note: t-values are based on robust standard errors as estimated by the Huber/White “sandwich” estimator. 
 
Imports, on the other hand, tend to have a negative effect on salaries in the sectors that 
produce these goods locally, most likely because they compete with locally produced goods 
and press down prices and salaries. The problem is biggest in the sectors where there is a 
considerable local production, i.e. the manufacturing of food, drinks, and clothing, whereas 
the imports of capital goods have no such negative effect since there is virtually no local 
production to compete with. Needless to say consumers might well have gained from 
imports. 
 
The estimated coefficients on the control variables all have the expected signs. Holding all 
other characteristics constant, people with more education tend to earn higher salaries,   
people with more experience tend to earn more (until a certain point), women tend to earn 
about 40% less than men, indigenous people tend to earn about 15% less than non-indigenous 
people, people in the highlands earn about 46% less than people in the lowlands, and people 
in the public sector about 66% more than people in the private sector. Of the non-tradeable 
sectors, the one that has the most attractive level of salaries is the banking sector, followed by 
hotel and restauration, transportation, commerce, electricity, construction. Far behind these 
comes traditional agriculture. The most attractive type of income owner is employer,   17
followed by white collar worker, blue collar worker, family worker, and cooperative worker, 
while self-employed in the informal sector is the least attractive. 
 
Persons who combine many of the characteristics with negative coefficients, for example 
indigenous women living in the rural highlands and working in subsistence agriculture from 
which there are no exports, have extremely low incomes and are thus extremely poor. Since 
they neither export nor import any goods there is little direct effect of trade on these 
unfortunate people. However, there may be indirect effects and medium to long run effects. It 
is possible that if some labor intensive export sectors boomed, these sectors could attract 
previously self-employed people into blue or white collar positions, which could imply a 
substantial improvement for these persons in terms of income.  
 
Table 8 shows how the composition of employment has changed between the census in 1992 
and the census in 2001.  
 
Table 8: Occupied population, by sector, 1992-2001 





Agriculture, hunting, fishing  966,760 877,432 -89,328  -1.1
Extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons  51,291 37,863 -13,428  -3.3
    Mining  45,119 32,016 -13,103  -3.7
    Hydrocarbons  6,172 5,847 -325  -0.6
Manufacturing industry  218,553 330,871 112,318  4.7
    Food products and tobacco  48,669 75,016 26,347  4.9
    Textiles, clothes and leather products  77,462 117,796 40,334  4.8
    Wood products and paper  13,032 12,032 -1,000  -0.9
    Editing and printing activities  7,377 11,308 3,931  4.9
    Chemical products  4,517 5,537 1,020  2.3
    Rubber and plastic products  1,547 3,115 1,568  8.1
    Non-metallic mineral products  14,485 22,065 7,580  4.8
    Metal products, except machinery and equipment  11,493 21,301 9,808  7.1
    Machinery and equipment  3,975 4,760 785  2.0
    Furniture and matresses  35,996 57,941 21,945  5.4
Services 1,194,883 1,749,890 555,007  4.3
    Electricity, gas, water  5,977 9,709 3,732  5.5
    Construction  124,104 184,649 60,545  4.5
    Commerce  204,039 483,328 279,289  10.1
    Hotels and restaurants  24,855 125,312 100,457  19.7
    Transport, storage, communication  114,078 167,214 53,136  4.3
    Financial intermediation  9,305 15,131 5,826  5.6
    Real estate, business and rental services  44,052 81,692 37,640  7.1
    Public administration, defence, social security  57,855 73,654 15,799  2.7
    Education  101,748 150,415 48,667  4.4
    Health and social services  33,849 60,158 26,309  6.6
    Community services  106,093 84,714 -21,379  -2.5
    Domestic services  102,229 144,074 41,845  3.9
    Services of foreign organizations  1,923 1,178 -745  -5.3
Not specified  264,776 168,662 -96,114  -4.9
Total 3,626,370 4,745,946 1,119,576  3.0
Source: National Statistical Institute, census tabulations. 
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The sector that have lost most employment between 1992 and 2001 is clearly the agricultural 
sector, and most likely the traditional part of agriculture, without exports. This is a positive 
development as extreme poverty tends to be concentrated in this sector. The mining sector 
has also lost a large number of jobs, which coincides with the fall in exports from that sector. 
This has likely contributed to an increase in poverty, as miners do not easily find alternative 
employment. The increase in hydrocarbon exports can not be seen in the number of jobs in 
the hydrocarbon sector, as the capitalization process included  a complete restructuring of the 
sector and a further intensification of capital instead of labor. 
 
The manufacturing sector has created more than 100,000 new jobs between 1992 and 2001, 
likely affected by the substantial increase in non-traditional exports, but not by foreign direct 
investment, which was almost negligible in the manufacturing sector. Most job creation was 
found in the manufacturing of textiles, clothes and leather products, followed by food 
products and furniture. 
 
By far the biggest job-generator between 1992 and 2001 was the service sector, however, 
largely unaffected by both exports and FDI. The hotel and restauration business has created 
almost 280,000 jobs, which is a very positive development for several reasons. First, the 
sector employs a lot of unqualified labor and pays relatively well (compared to realistic 
alternatives for these workers). It is thus likely to have a beneficial effect on poverty. Second, 
it employs relatively many women, offering a very desirable alternative to the informal and 
badly paid jobs in private residences. Third, the sector services to a large extent foreigners, 
which means that it generates foreign revenues, even if no goods leave the country. Fourth, 
there are many positive spill-over effects to other sectors, as the sector uses mainly local 
inputs. This sector is likely to be responsible for a large part of the extra construction jobs and 
they may also have provided stimulation for several manufacturing sub-sectors (e.g. furniture, 
matresses and textiles). They may also help create a critical mass of tourist facilities, that can 
help stimulate the more lucrative parts of the tourism business than the young back-packers 
that currently tend to dominate the picture. 
 
All in all, although there are many positive trends to be observed in the sectoral composition 
of jobs in Bolivia, FDI and changes in trade patterns do not seem to be the drivers of those 
changes.  
 
An alternative way of analyzing the distributional impacts of exports from different sectors is 
presented in a recent study by Andersen & Evia (2003). It uses a highly disaggregated 
Computable General Equilibrium Model
8 of the Bolivian economy to investigate the likely 
impacts of hypothetical, price-induced export booms in several different export sectors. The 
model operates with 13 different productive sectors and six different household types as well 
as a government sector and an entity called “Rest of the World”. The flows in the model are 
based on a social accounting matrix from 1997 that shows from which sectors each type of 
household earns their income and in which sectors they spend their money
9. It also shows 
where the government gets its revenues from and how it spends these revenues. With such a 
model it is possible to experiment with the international trade variables and see who would be 
affected and how. 
 
                                                 
8 The disaggregated CGE model was developed mainly by Manfred Wiebelt of Kiel Institute for World 
Economics based on a more aggregated CGE model developed by Luis Carlos Jemio. 
9 The disaggregated Social Accounting Matrix was developed by a group of researchers at the Kiel Institute for 
World Economics. It is described in detail in Thiele & Piazolo (2003).    19
The results from the study indicate that there are three export sectors that have beneficial 
impacts on inequality and poverty, in the sense that exports from these sectors would tend to 
increase the income of the poorer population groups and reduce the Gini coefficient of 
inequality. One is “Modern Agriculture” whose expansion would tend to benefit especially 
rural unskilled workers, urban informals, and, to a smaller extent, employers. Another is 
“Consumer Goods
10” which tend to benefit urban informals and rural small-holders, the two 
population groups which contain almost all urban and rural poor. The last export sector with 
such beneficial properties is the “Coca” sector which provides dramatic benefits for rural 
unskilled workers and rural small-holders. 
 
In sharp contrast to these three sectors stands the traditional export sector, namely “Mining.” 
A boom in mining exports would tend to benefit the already richest population group, 
employers, and the relatively well-paid unskilled workers that work in the mines
11. Rural 
workers and rural small-holders would suffer substantial reductions in their income, mainly 
due to the adverse effects on “Modern Agriculture” arising from the “Dutch Disease” that 
invariably would follow the mining boom.  
 
A natural gas boom would have little effect on household incomes and thus little effect on the 
income distribution. The only big effect is to be felt on government revenues, but even after 
all these revenues have been spent and invested, households are unlikely to be better off, 
unless the government dramatically changes their spending and investment patterns. 
 
According to Table 4, less than 5% of all FDI received between 1996 and 2001 went into the 
three export sectors that tend to have a beneficial impact on poverty and inequality, and this 
modest contribution was partly or wholly offset by the efforts to eradicate the one sector 





Bolivia introduced the New Economic Plan in 1985 in the hope that this would attract more 
investment and foster trade which would lead to faster growth and poverty reduction. Nearly 
two decades on, this plan seems to have failed to achieve many of its goals. Trade as percent 
of GDP has not increased, though FDI has increased due to the privatisation policy. GDP per 
capita has not increased when taken over the past four decades (though it must be noted that 
other politically unstable economies have seen GDP per capita fall), but there appears to be 
an upturn in GDP per capita over the latter half of the period. 
 
Poverty has fallen in the 1990s particularly in regions that were already less poor, but there 
appears to have been some reversal in the most recent years. Inequality in capital cities 
increased dramatically. Thus it seems that the increase in FDI and the continuation of existing 
exports have not been able to reduce (income) poverty and inequality significantly. For this, 
trade and FDI have not had a sufficient poverty-focus. For example, FDI has not benefited 
(export) sectors such as clothing and modern agriculture that would help income 
opportunities of the poor. 
                                                 
10 The “Consumer Goods” sector inludes food, beverages, clothes, leather, wood, paper, wood products, and 
paper products. 
11 Miners, as well as most other unskilled workers, earn about  $120-140/month and are thus located well above 
the moderate poverty line ($60/month). The two large groups located below the poverty line are rural small-
holders and self-employed urban informals.    20
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